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1. INTRODUCTION
The world debt crisis will not go away.' If ignored it will, at best,
cloud Latin America's economic' and political' future. At the end of
1987, developing countries owed a total external debt in the range of $1
trillion.4 The three largest Latin American debtors, Brazil, Mexico and
Argentina, together owed approximately $270 billion.5 Interest pay-
ments for Brazil and Mexico alone amounted to $22 billion for fiscal
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1985,
New York University.
' See generally D. DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK: THE FULL STORY OF THE
WORLD CREDIT CRISIS 232-51 (1985) (discussing the future of the Latin American
debt); Kuczynski, The Outlook for Central American Debt, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 129-30,
137, 143 (1987) (reviewing the Latin American debt crisis as of the fall of 1987);
Hernindez Col6n, Sharing the Burden of Latin Debt, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1987, at
A23, col. 1 (commenting on the lingering problems caused by the debt).
' There is no realistic way for countries to keep up their debt service obligations
while maintaining economic growth. Current arrangements for servicing debt siphon
away the capital a less developed nation needs in order to achieve healthy levels of
economic growth. Without such growth, a nation with outstanding debts will not be
able to meet its long-term financial obligations. Failure to alter existing debt obliga-
tions, therefore, will ultimately result in either a cycle of rescheduling or in default. D.
DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 243-44; Kucyznski, supra note 1, at 140; Purcell, War
and Debt in South America, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 660, 668 (1982).
1 For a review of the relationship of the Latin American debt to Latin America's
political future, see Roett, Democracy and Debt in South America: A Continent's Di-
lemma, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 695 (1983); see also Hernindez Col6n, supra note 1 (Gover-
nor of Puerto Rico warning "Washington that democracy in Latin America could be in
grave danger if the debt problem is not brought under control").
" Farnsworth, New Debt Relief Policy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1987, at Al, col. 1;
see also Kilborn, Official Gloom on Third World Debt, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1987, at
Dl, col. 5. In 1987, Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Cochairman of First Boston International,
estimated Latin American foreign debt at $400 billion. Kuczynski, supra note 1, at
130.
' Truell & Murray, Debt Breakthrough, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
As of December 31, 1986, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina owed external debt in the
amounts of $110.3 billion, $100.3 billion and $57.7 billion respectively. Id.
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year 1985.6 Even if net exports from Latin American nations remain
high, it is estimated that the interest payments will consume between
thirty-five and forty-five percent of those nations' yearly export earn-
ings.' Any economic downturn in Latin America will exacerbate this
debt domination; if exports are reduced, less money is available for na-
tional development while the financial obligation to service the existing
debt remains unchanged.' Such a drop in available capital would create
a pressing need for further borrowing.9
Even without a major economic downswing, no Latin American
nation has proven that it can combine growth with the avoidance of
unsound borrowing - a combination that is required if a nation is to
grow out of its debt.10 Moreover, the current disruption of the United
8 Meltzer, International Debt Problems 1 (July 1986) (unpublished abstract
available from the Department of Economics, Carnegie-Mellon University). During the
period from 1983 to 1986, Brazil paid over $40 billion in interest to foreign banks.
Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil together paid a total of $120 billion in inter-
est during the same period. Henry, Brazil Says: Nuts, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 12, 1987,
at 25, 29.
' Purcell, supra note 2, at 670; see also Hormats, The World Economy Under
Stress, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 455, 476 (1985) (noting that in many Latin American coun-
tries debt service payments are growing more rapidly than export earnings); Rogers,
The U.S. and Latin America, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 560, 576 (1984) (noting that, even
with restructuring and adjustment, Latin America's debt will continue to consume a
large fraction of total export earnings for the rest of the decade).
8 See Bailey & Watkins, Mexico's Dilemma, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1987, at A19,
col. 2. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America estimates that
from 1982 to 1986 repayment of principal and interest by Latin American nations to
creditor nations amounted to approximately $100 billion more than new loans from
these nations. L. MALKIN, THE NATIONAL DEBT 87 (1987); see also Silk, Economic
Scene: Critical Puzzle for the LM.F., N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1987, at D2, col. 1 (com-
menting on the unwillingness of commercial banks to lend new money to debt-plagued
Latin nations); Rockefeller, Let's Not Write Off Latin America, N.Y. Times, July 5,
1987, at E15, col. 2 (discussing the continuing reluctance of commercial banks to lend
additional funds).
I The reduction in capital is the result of less money being earned through foreign
exchange. Because there is less money overall coming into the nation, a greater propor-
tion of what is available must be devoted to servicing existing debt obligations. This, in
effect, fuels the rescheduling fire. See infra text accompanying notes 81-91.
10 United States experts predicted that the debt crisis would be successfully re-
solved when debtor nations grew out of their debts. These experts believed that encour-
agement of economic growth in Latin America through loans by a supranational
lender, e.g., the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund [hereinafter IMF],
coupled with national austerity programs, would produce sufficient growth to achieve
this. See D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 234-38; Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 130; see
also Bolin & Del Canto, LDC Debt Crisis Management, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 1099
(1983) (suggesting a system that would mobilize support from the export sectors of
industrialized countries via joint financing by national export credit organizations, pri-
vate commercial banks and the World Bank); Ipsen, Can the Baker Plan Work?, IN-
STITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1985, at 279, 280-82 (discussing the solution proposed
by United States Treasury Secretary James Baker).
This model, however, has failed to produce tangible results. See Rogers, supra
note 7, at 576; Rotberg, The World Bank Approach to Debt, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1983,
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States economy resulting from that nation's trade deficit"1 has had an
adverse effect upon Latin American nations. 2 United States domestic
pressure to raise protectionist barriers has resulted in the loss of mar-
kets long relied on by Latin American exporters.1 " These United States
markets are the very ones which Latin American nations must sell to if
they are to earn foreign exchange dollars to meet their debt payments.1 4
Unfortunately, United States officials have not only tended to treat the
trade deficit as a problem isolated from the Latin American debt, 5 but
have also been slow to consider the problem of Latin America's debt as
at 22; McCoy & Truell, Lending Imbroglio: Worries Deepen Again on Third World
Debt as Brazil Stops Paying, Wall St. J., March 3, 1987, at 1, col. 6. See generally
Roett, supra note 3, at 697-98 (discussing the general conditions that prevent Latin
American nations from generating sufficient capital from exports to escape the debt
cycle).
" For a general discussion of current United States economic ills, see D.
HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING (1986) (discussing the demise of United States com-
petitiveness in international automobile markets); L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 41-55,
90-130; R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983) (discussing the need for
the United States to increase productivity and to find new areas for expansion); P.
SIMON, LET'S PUT AMERICA BACK TO WORK 3-25 (1987) (exploring the relationship
of United States productivity and unemployment); Diebold, The United States in the
World Economy: A Fifty Year Perspective, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 81 (1983) (surveying the
deterioration of international economic cooperation over the last 50 years and its effect
on the United States); Fox & Cooney, Protectionism Returns, 53 FOREIGN POL'y 74
(1983) (suggesting an attack on the erosion of the United States industrial base).
" In 1983, the United States had an $8 billion trade deficit flowing to Latin
America, compared with a $3.8 billion surplus in 1982. This trend and the resulting
drop in United States employment have spurred advocacy of protectionist measures di-
rected against Latin American products. Roett, supra note 3, at 698; see also P. Si-
MON, supra note 11, at 98-103. For an in-depth discussion of the close economic and
political ties between the United States and Latin America, see A. LOWENTHAL, PART-
NERS IN CONFLICT: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA (1987).
I Roett, supra note 3, at 697-98.
14 Id. at 698. In addition, the economic ills of Latin America have resulted in the
loss of traditional United States export markets. In 1981, the United States exported
approximately $42 billion worth of goods to Latin America; in 1984-1986, sales fell to
about $30 billion per year. Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 136. One former United States
Treasury Department official has noted that failure to reinvigorate the Third World
economy will result in increasing losses of United States manufacturing jobs. Broad,
How About a Real Solution to Third World Debt?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1987, at
A25, col. 5.
1" See P. SIMON, supra note 11, at 99. To the contrary, the United States federal
deficit is intimately wedded to the Latin American debt crisis. The large deficits that
are consistently incurred by the United States Government make credit a scarce re-
source and result in increased interest rates. As Latin America's need to borrow contin-
ues, these higher interest rates further compound the debt burden and make prompt or
manageable repayment more problematic. Roett, supra note 3, at 717. It has been
suggested that this problem could be alleviated by a cap on interest rates on loans to
developing countries. Although debtor nations generally favor such a plan, and Council
of Economic Advisers Chairman Martin Feldstein gave it a qualified endorsement in
1984, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan ultimately rejected it as impractical. See Feld-
stein, Regan Disagree on Wisdom of Capping Interest Rates to LDCs, 20 Int'l Trade
Reporter's U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 33, at 980 (1984).
1988]
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anything more than a temporary condition that ultimately will self-
correct.16
Despite this official neglect, the high volume of trade between the
United States and its southern neighbors makes Latin American eco-
nomic health vital to that of the United States. 7 Moreover, on account
of its unique historical ties to Latin American nations, the United
States has long considered the nations as existing in "America's back-
yard."' 8 Thus, not only does the United States have an economic inter-
est of the type common to all nations with outstanding loans in the
region,' 9 the United States additionally defines Latin American politi-
cal stability as a major tenet of its foreign policy.2
1" The Reagan administration and most United States bankers denied any need
for far-ranging solutions. They maintained that the problem was a temporary liquidity
crisis and did not require a fundamental change in the status quo. D. DELAMAIDE,
supra note 1, at 234-41; see also P. SIMON, supra note 11, at 99 (describing years of
United States attitude of benign neglect); Rogers, supra note 7, at 577 (contrasting the
heavy political and military engagement of the United States in Central America with
its policy that Latin America's financial problems should be left, as far as possible, to
private banks and the IMF). But see Bogdanowicz-Bindert, World Debt: The United
States Reconsiders, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 259, 267-68 (1986) (noting that United States
administration officials finally have recognized that the debt crisis is here to stay); Ip-
sen, supra note 10, at 280 (United States Treasury Secretary James Baker hinting that
dramatic policy changes may be in order).
17 See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
18 The United States has perceived Latin America as an area of vital national
interest since 1823 when the United States adopted the Monroe Doctrine, which
warned European countries against intervention in Latin America. W. LANGER, AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY 644, 770 (1948). Compare Rogers, supra note 7,
at 560-76 (discussing modern United States interest and intervention in Latin America)
with Maviglia, Mexico's Guidelines for Foreign Investment: The Selective Promotion of
Necessary Industries, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 282-83 (1986) (surveying Mexican re-
sponse to foreign dominance). It should also be remembered that the immense differ-
ences among Latin American nations (in size, wealth,- geopolitical capacity, character of
government and independence from United States influence) along with the varying
United States policies towards different countries, make it difficult to speak of the re-
gion in unitary terms. Katznelson & Prewitt, Constitutionalism, Class, and the Limits
of Choice in U.S. Foreign Policy, in CAPITALISM AND THE STATE IN U.S.-LATIN
AMERICAN RELATIONS 25 (R. Fagen ed. 1979).
19 The extension of credit to developing countries is indispensible to world eco-
nomic recovery. See Bolin & Del Canto, supra note 10, at 1100.
20 The United States traditionally has encouraged democracy south of its own bor-
der. However, from the administration of President Kennedy through that of President
Carter, United States policy toward Latin America came to involve less overt interven-
tion, some economic disengagement, and increased concern over human rights and qual-
ity of life. Katznelson & Prewitt, supra note 18, at 25. President Reagan's administra-
tion returned to a more traditional "backyard" policy in both Central America and the
Caribbean and reasserted the vital interest of the United States throughout the region.
But even with news in the 1980s of the collapse of military regimes (Argentina), fur-
ther liberalization (Brazil) and popular pressures to restore democracy (Uruguay and
Chile), Latin American stability has been threatened by the growing social and political
implications of economic difficulties. See Henry, supra note 6, at 28-29; Roett, supra
note 3, at 695-97; Rogers, supra note 7, at 573-76; Fishlow, Coming to Terms with the
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After a half decade of analysis and commentary, a solution to the
debt crisis is no closer than it was when the threat of Mexican default
was first publicly acknowledged.21 If the world economy is ever to move
beyond the stage of perpetual crisis2 2 posed by the current debt,23 new
tactics must be openly explored, and the status quo must be
reexamined.
2 4
This Comment will review the origins of the current Latin Ameri-
can debt crisis 25 and the rise of loan rescheduling."6 Next, it will dis-
cuss the financial restrictions caused by rescheduling 27 and the relation-
ship between rescheduling and the United States balance of trade.2"
The need for solutions and incentives to alleviate the debt crisis will
then be explored,2" with emphasis on international barter (counter-
trade)30 and debt-for-equity exchanges."1 Debt-for-equity is a new con-
Latin Debt, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at A19, col. 5.
" Alpern & Emerson, Making Life Easier for Debtor Nations, N.Y. Times, Feb.
7, 1987, at A27, col. 1; see also L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 77; Heinemann, World
Debt Crisis, on Back Burner, Still Simmers, AM. BANKER, May 28, 1985, at 6;
Makin, Facing the Facts About Global Debt, Bus. WK., Nov. 18, 1985, at 22; Fishlow,
supra note 20, at A19, col. 1; Broad, supra note 14, at A25, col. 2.
22 One commentator has characterized the international debt crisis as a "chronic
disease." L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 77.
23 The debt crisis threatens economic stability not only in the Third World but
also in all nations. See generally Bolin & Del Canto, supra note 10, at 1099-112 (fo-
cusing on the long-term aspects of the debt problem and on the threat posed by reduc-
tions in future sources of credit).
24 Ironically, the most creative thought aimed at rescue of Latin American bor-
rowers has come from outside the circle of direct participants. Id. at 1100; see also
Lissakers, A Lesson from Japanese Banks, N.Y. Times, March 24, 1987, at A31, col.
1. However, a new proposal by Mexico and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
may change this trend. For a discussion of this plan, see infra note 105; see also Ben-
nett, Big Bank Proposes a Plan for Easing Third-World Debt, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30,
1987, at Al, col. 6; Truell & Murray, supra note 5, Al, col. 1.
25 See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
2I See infra notes 47-73 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
s See infra notes 111-50 and accompanying text. A countertrade transaction usu-
ally consists of a parallel set of obligations by which each party undertakes to sell goods
and services to the other in separate but related transactions. Countertrade is essentially
a set of rules which are imposed by one nation on trading partners of other nations who
must comply with the rules if they wish to transact business. Lochner, Guide to
Countertrade and International Barter, 19 INT'L LAW. 725, 727 (1985); see also
McVey, Countertrade and Barter: Alternative Trade Financing by Third World Na-
tions, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 197 (1980-1981).
" See infra notes 151-76 and accompanying text. Debt-for-equity exchanges in-
volve the conversion of debt to equity in corporations in the debtor nation, national
holdings or some form of national financial credit. See Debt-Equity Swaps, Bull. No. 1,
at 2 (Aug. 1987) (available from Coopers & Lybrand, New York, N.Y.); see also
Dornbusch, Impact on Debtor Countries of World Economic Conditions, in EXTERNAL
DEBT, SAVINGS AND GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA 79-82 (A. Martirena ed. 1987);
19881
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cept,3 2 barter is an ancient one.33 Although neither device has been for-
mally recognized in United States economic policy, both have begun to
play a role in international financial markets and Latin American pol-
icy. 4 By analyzing these two financial tactics and exploring possible
refinements of them, proposals can be developed for improving United
States policy. 5
2. THE WORLD DEBT CRISIS
In August of 1982,6 the world banking community became
acutely aware of its vulnerability to default by Latin American debtors.
Mexico, whose outstanding foreign debt exceeded $80 billion, thirty
percent of which was due within the year," had exhausted its foreign
exchange reserves. The Mexican Government notified the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States Secretary of the Treasury
and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board that it could not meet
its immediate financial obligations.3" As a result, Mexico would be
Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 133; Meltzer, supra note 6, at 7.
32 See Meltzer, A Way to Defuse the World Debt Bomb, FORTUNE, Nov. 28, 1983,
at 137 (an early discussion of debt-for-equity exchanges).
" Most anthropologists and economic historians agree that barter evolved quite
naturally from the exchange of gifts. M. GERSHMAN, SMARTER BARTER 14-21 (1986)
(surveying the successive stages of barter). The Bible records an early example of bar-
ter when Esau exchanged his birthright for "bread and pottage of lentiles." Genesis
25:31-34 (King James ed.).
s See infra notes 111-25, 151-207 and accompanying text.
's See infra notes 141-50, 208-47 and accompanying text.
38 Commentators trace the emergence of a full-fledged debt crisis to a variety of
dates-and events. However, it was the announcement by Mexico of its inability to meet
its debt obligations that brought the monetary and fiscal crisis to a head. From August
of 1982 until the spring of 1983, 15 countries initiated renegotiation of the terms of
more than $90 billion of debt. See D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 6-8; W. GREIDER,
SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 483-85, 503, 517-19 (1987). But see Clark, Sovereign Debt
Restructurings: Parity of Treatment Between Equivalent Creditors in Relation to
Comparable Debts, 20 INT'L LAW. 857, 857 (1986) (assserting that the modern sover-
eign debt crisis began in Poland in 1981).
" Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 262. The Third World and Eastern
Europe together owed $626 billion of outstanding foreign debt by 1982. D. DE-
LAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 7.
38 Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 262. For the most part, the debt owed
by Mexico, as well as that owed by Brazil and Argentina, is bank debt. Although banks
are private, profit-oriented institutions, they nevertheless acquire the political alignment
of the nation in which they are headquartered. For example, during the 1982 Falkland
Islands dispute between Britain and Argentina, Argentina withheld debt payments
from British banks. During the 1979-1981 United States-Iran hostage crisis, United
States banks froze Iranian assets. Political crises thus reveal the political character of
banks.
In addition, the size of the debts and the importance of the banks involved mean
that the world debt crisis threatens the entire world financial structure. See D. DE-
LAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 226-27; W. GREIDER, supra note 36, at 517; L. MALKIN,
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forced to suspend all debt payments for three months and, in the in-
terim, to reach an agreement on rescheduling payments.3 9
The failure of a country to meet its debt obligations was not with-
out precedent.4 For example, in 1976 Mexico had faced a similar
problem in meeting its foreign obligations."' Zaire, Peru and Turkey
had each faced the prospect of default in the mid-1970s,42 and, as early
as 1890, financial difficulties in Argentina nearly bankrupted a major
British bank.43 The history of Latin American debt, with the accompa-
nying threat of default, dates back to the rise of independent Latin
American nations in the 1820s."" The incidents of economic crisis prior
to 1982 were, however, relatively isolated events; in comparison, the
world debt problem, to which Mexico's 1982 difficulties were but a
prelude, threatens far greater economic repercussions than anything
previously encountered."5 No prior economic crisis has involved such a
large amount of debt owed to so many creditors in so many countries. 6
supra note 8, at 77.
39 D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 3; see L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 86; see
also Broad, supra note 14, at A25, col. 6.
4" See generally L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 68-75 (discussing the relationship
between sovereign debtors and their creditors over a seven-century period).
,' Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 262. For a description of the role of
loans in the overall modern world financial order, see D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at
53-69.
42 D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 56-69.
Baring Brothers, a renowned British merchant bank, took part in the late nine-
teenth-century wave of private investment in developing countries. Creditors bought
shares in, and bonds of, railroads and other industries in developing nations. Only a
massive bailout saved the bank from failure when Argentina failed to meet its obliga-
tions. Id. at 53-54; L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 71.
"" Latin American countries began borrowing and defaulting as soon as they
gained independence in the 1820s. By 1827, all of the more than £20 million in Latin
American bonds floated in London were in default. D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at
96; see also L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 69.
It is also instructive to note that, during the 1920s, Latin American nations en-
gaged in a round of borrowing which led to default during the 1930s. In the 1940s, the
United States and Britain wrote-off much of the accumulated debt which, in effect,
opened the door to investment and rapid economic growth. Lissakers, supra note 24, at
A31, col. 6.
"' See Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 262; Tapia, Mexico's Debt Re-
structuring: The Evolving Solution, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 1 (1984); see
also Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 137.
"' See D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 1-5 (discussing the long weekend of nego-
tiations that began on August 12, 1982, when Jesus Silva Herzog, Mexico's Minister
of Finance, notified Donald Regan that Mexico was facing "a number of problems");
L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 72-73 (noting that current Latin American interest pay-
ments "are at least double the level of reparations that Germany found intolerable in
the prewar era that produced Hitler"); Tapia, supra note 45, at 1. For contemporary
reports on the crisis appearing in the popular press, see The Crash of 198?, ECONO-
MIST, Oct. 16, 1982, at 13; The Debt Bomb, TIME, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42; Quirk, Busted
Flat on Wall Street, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 16/23, 1982, at 19 (discussing the effect of
19881
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2.1. The Rise of Rescheduling
In the fall of 1982, the world financial community responded to
the Mexican crisis with stopgap measures.4 7 The short-term program
devised by the concerned parties consisted of three elements. First,
Mexico's commercial bank creditors would commit $5 billion to a new
money facility for 1983.4' Second, the public Mexican debt49 of ap-
proximately $23 billion5" owed to commercial lenders and due between
August 22, 1982 and December 31, 1984 would be restructured over an
eight-year period. 5 Third, the IMF would disburse $3.9 billion over a
three-year period as part of an Extended Fund Arrangement for
Mexico.52
This restructuring did not alleviate the long-term financial burden
posed by the debt,5" nor did it allow Mexico to return to the normal
international credit markets.54 Although, in retrospect, the 1982-1984
restructuring effort can only be regarded as a transient solution, the
Mexican rescheduling arrangement has been the model used by most
Mexico's debt crisis on Citibank); Shearlock, The Day the World Ran Out of Credit,
The Sunday Times (London), Sept. 5, 1982, at 53, col. 1.
" For a general review of the first round of Mexican debt restructuring, see
Tapia, supra note 45, at 5-7; see also Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 263
(discussing the joint cooperation in the fall of 1982 that produced a quick response to
Mexico's inability to meet its payments).
48 Tapia, supra note 45, at 5. This new money facility was basically an involun-
tary lending operation that provided the only means by which Mexican public sector
borrowers could remain current on their interest payments to foreign creditors. In addi-
tion, 13 banks were invited to form a Bank Advisory Group for Mexico. The Advisory
Group, in addition to its role as representative of the international banking community,
would act as regional coordinator in connection with the syndication of the $5 billion.
Id. at 5-6; see also Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 263.
' Public debt is the debt owed by a government and its various components as
distinguished from debt owed by private corporations and individuals. In 1982, the
combined public and private Mexican debt exceeded $80 billion, 30% of which was due
in a single year. W. GREIDER, supra note 36, at 517; Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note
16, at 262. It should be remembered that the distinction between public and private
debtors within a nation is largely irrelevant to the subject of this Comment. Both types
of debt are a matter of political interest for the borrowing nation. The overall develop-
ment policy of debtor nations relies equally on financing for private and public institu-
tions. D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 226-27.
o Tapia, supra note 45, at 6.
5 Id. at 5. At the end of 1984, a new restructuring agreement was implemented
and the establishment of a second new money facility became necessary. The 1984 new
money facility was in the amount of approximately $3.8 billion. Id. at 7-8.
52 Id. at 5.
11 See D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 227; W. GREIDER, supra note 36, at 517;
Broad, supra note 14, at A25, col. 2. In view of the uncertainties that prevailed in the
international financial markets at the time, there was no consensus regarding how
Mexico's debt problem would be resolved in the long run. Tapia, supra note 45, at 7.
5" Tapia, supra note 45, at 7.
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Latin American nations in renegotiating their debts.5 5 The Mexican
crisis altered the way in which banks and governments dealt with inter-
national debt problems."6 From August of 1982 until the spring of
1983, fifteen countries began renegotiating the terms of more than $90
billion in debt owed to commercial banks. 17 Since 1982, over forty
countries have either rescheduled their debts or are in the process of
doing so. "' In almost every case, the Mexican agreement is the model
relied upon. 9 Though the Mexican solution was only short-term,6" the
procedures and forms of documentation used by Mexico for restructur-
ing have become the model for several other sovereign renegotiations.6
A "rescheduling market" based on Mexican procedures has emerged.
The prevailing terms and conditions of rescheduling are now generally
determined based on credit ratings relative to Mexico's most recent
agreement.
6 2
The rescheduling of foreign debt is now an essential element of the
world economy.' 3 By offering new credit while extending the time for
repayment of principal,6" the creditor allows the debtor nation, at least
" Id. at 7; see also Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 263-64; Robinson,
The Alpha and Omega of Rescheduling, EUROMONEY, May 1984, at 136.
6" See generally Lissakers, Dateline Wall Street: Faustian Finance, 51 FOREIGN
POL'Y 160 (1983) (describing the systematic changes brought about by Mexico's liquid-
ity crisis).
57 D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 7; see also W. GREIDER, supra note 36, at
519.
5 Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 263; see also D. DELAMAIDE, supra
note 1, at 121-23 (discussing Brazil's rescheduling negotiations); Robinson, supra note
55, at 136.
:' Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 263.
60 But see Bolin & Del Canto, supra note 10, at 1101-04 (suggesting that
rescheduling the debt does not postpone the problem).
61 Tapia, supra note 45, at 7; see also Robinson, supra note 55, at 136.
62 The use of Mexico as a yardstick is logical from the banks' point of view. It
also means, however, that those debtors needing the most help must pay the greatest
price for assistance. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 263-64.
6S See Beim, Must We Torpedo Our Banks?, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1987, at A25,
col. 1 (noting that negotiations between the world's major banks and less developed
countries have become "a constant").
Nowadays, any debate regarding rescheduling generally concerns the terms and
the time period under which extended repayment should occur. For example, in 1984,
Martin Feldstein, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, suggested that banks
should consider not only extending automatic loans but also capping the interest rates
on those loans. Anthony Solomon, then President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, also noted that techniques of limiting interest rates should be investigated by
those involved in debt negotiations. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, however, called
such plans impractical and unacceptable to creditors. See Feldstein, Regan Disagree on
Wisdom of Capping Interest Rates to LDCs, supra note 15, at 980.
64 The current structure and size of outstanding debts has created a symbiotic
relationship between debtors and creditors. The sheer size of outstanding loans means
that any suspension of interest payments will be exceedingly costly to creditor banks.
As a result banks take the expedient course of extending further credit to debtor na-
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theoretically, to increase national solvency and concentrate on economic
growth through increased production and exports.65 Through the
rescheduling of the debt, the creditor continues to invest in the economic
future of the debtor nation. The lender, however, has few alternatives.
If the creditor bank refuses to reschedule the debt or to grant further
loans, the debtor would not be able to maintain its repayments to the
bank.68 Unlike private borrowers, debtor nations cannot go bankrupt"7
and have no real means by which to liquidate their assets. 8 Refusal by
tions, regardless of the risk, so that the debtor can meet its payments with the proceeds
of new borrowing. Although this solution saves the banks from the necessity of immedi-
ately recognizing losses, it also subjects them to considerable leverage by debtor nations.
See, e.g., Silk, Economic Scene: Brazil's Battle Against Banks, N.Y. Times, March 4,
1987, at D2, col. 1 (discussing suspension of interest payments as a threat to creditor
banks); McCoy & Truell, supra note 10, at 1, col. 6 (announcing Brazil's suspension
of interest payments); Riding, Brazil to Suspend Interest Payments to Foreign Banks,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1987, at Al, col. 1. But see Rockefeller, supra note 8, at E15,
col. 2 (arguing that there is no real fear of loan default).
65 See Rockefeller, supra note 8, at E15, col. 2; see also Latin American Debtors:
Time Shifter Incorporated, ECONOMIST, March 5, 1983, at 86; Bailey & Watkins,
supra note 8, at A19, col. 2.
68 The extension of new credit and the rescheduling of outstanding loans enable
debtor nations to increase domestic savings and to accelerate production of revenue pro-
ducing exports. This scenario, however, assumes favorable world economic conditions.
Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 263. Compare Fine, Banks Are Urged to Lend
More to Third World to Recover Debt, AM. BANKER, May 20, 1986, at 2. (arguing
that increased investment is necessary to assure creditor recovery of outstanding loans)
with Horowitz, Bankers Apprehensive on Further Loans to LDCs, J. Com., May 20,
1986, at 2A, col. 5 (noting rising concern that creditors may be throwing good money
after bad).
6 One observer has stated that it "had become axiomatic in the 1970s to assert
that sovereign states cannot go bankrupt." Clark, supra note 36, at 858. Moreover,
Clark has argued that the 1980s have demonstrated the validity of the axiom:
Clearly there are no formal insolvency or liquidation rules that apply to
sovereign states. There is no method by which the assets of a sovereign
state can be distributed among the creditors. Creditors have not scrambled
to obtain security for their debts as they usually do in domestic work outs.
Instead the creditors have resorted to long, patient negotiations to put their
debts on a more orderly footing, essentially a footing on which interest
payments will be maintained.
Id.; see also L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 88 (noting that "[t]he banks' only real pun-
ishment for default would be the same as it was in the nineteenth century: closing the
financial markets to new credit for the debtor countries and thus blocking their trade");
Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 143 (commenting that "[almong the debtors the siren song
of default is gaining new support"). But see Western Banks Declare North Korea in
Default, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1987, at 20, col. 2 (reporting that western bankers have
declared North Korea to be in "total default" on its loans).
6' A bankrupt company liquidates its assets to repay its creditors. Countries can-
not do this. The only means a country has to liquidate assets is to lower the standard of
living of its citizens. D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 9-10. To some degree, this has
been the approach advocated by the IMF and a variety of United States economists.
This strategy calls for increased loans and rescheduling tied to austerity programs. See
Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 267-69. However, such programs can also cre-
ate political instability. See Purcell, supra note 2, at 671; Roett, supra note 3, at 698-
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the creditor bank to extend new credit, therefore, would only result in
the bank not being repaid,69 and, ultimately, being forced to write the
loan off as a loss.70 Because many banks have extended loans to Latin
America that are larger than their net assets,7' a write-off of the loans
would threaten the banks with bankruptcy.72 Therefore, banks are vir-
tually forced to enter into iultibillion dollar workouts of the type rep-
resented by the Latin American debt rescheduling.7
2.2. The Financial Restrictions Caused by Debt Rescheduling
Although the actions taken to avert disaster in 1982, T and those subse-
quently taken whenever a debtor country threatened to default on its
obligations, 5 have prevented the financial collapse of countries and
banks, several problems have been created by the system of reschedul-
702; see also L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 87.
0' See, e.g., D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 194-212 (surveying modern fears of
bank failure); L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 89; Quirk, supra note 46, at 19 (discussing
the effect of Mexico's debt crisis on Citibank).
7 When the risk of nonpayment is sufficiently great, the International Lending
Supervision Act of 1983, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912 (Supp. 1986), mandates the estab-
lishment of special reserves by United States lenders. For regulations by which the
Federal Reserve Board [hereinafter FRB or Board], the Comptroller of the Currency
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation determine which loans require such
reserves, see 12 C.F.R. § 211.41-.43 (1987). For a discussion of possible write-offs of
Brazilian loans, see Henry, supra note 6, at 25; Riding, supra note 64, at Al, col. 1.
71 This principle has recently been demonstrated where the financial futures of
extremely large corporations were at risk. The most notable example was the bailout of
the Chrysler Corporation, a firm which was considered to be too important to the
United States economy to be allowed to fail. See generally D. DELAMAIDE, supra note
1, at 177-93 (discussing Chrysler and other companies that are too big for bankruptcy).
72 Id. at 194-95; L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 88, 130; see Some Big Banks Plan
to Shun Mexican Plan, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1988, at 3, col. 2. Such concerns have led
several major banks to increase reserves. For example, in the spring of 1987, Citicorp
increased its reserves by $3 billion. Overall, banks have set aside approximately $20
billion in new reserves since May of 1987. These increases were specifically designed to
cover potential losses from Latin American loans. See Rowe, Bank's Decision Seen as
Sign of Strength, Wash. Post, May 21, 1987, at F1, col. 4; Swardson, Citicorp Move
Brings New Era: Huge Reserve Raises Stakes in Debt Talks, Wash. Post, May 21,
1987, at Fl, col. 3; see also Rules on Debt Recast by Reed and Preston, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 4, 1988, at D2, col. 4; Makin, Helping Banks and the Third World, Too, N.Y.
Times, May 26, 1987, at A23, col. 2.
Several commentators, however, have argued that the increased reserves are of lit-
tle practical significance. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 6, at 25 (arguing that the new
reserves could easily be erased by default of a single Latin American debtor); Rockefel-
ler, supra note 8, at E15, col. 2 (noting that the new reserves have not in any signifi-
cant way altered or alleviated the status quo).
73 D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 194-95; Bolin & Del Canto, supra note 10, at
1100-01.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
71 See, e.g., Riding, supra note 64, at Al, col. 1, A35, col. 1 (reporting on Brazil's
most recent announcement of interest payment suspension).
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ing and by the loans that were extended in the wake of Mexico's 1982
rescheduling.
76
Additional credit has been extended, out of necessity, to debtor na-
tions in financial distress.7 Creditor banks have increased their expo-
sure in the countries most heavily in debt.78 Additionally, the repay-
ment schedules of these nations have been extended,"9 thus assuring
that financial resource transfers from the debtor to the lender will con-
tinue well into the future.80 This extended repayment obligation hin-
ders future economic development inthe debtor nation by assuring that
financial gains will be utilized to service the debt. l The debtor nation
thus faces dual and conflicting objectives: growth and debt service.8 2
Debt rescheduling has led to a drop in net new lending throughout
Latin America. 83 Because the amount of capital available for loans is
78 See DeWitt, Credit Analysis and International Loans, MGMT. INT'L REV.,
Winter 1986, at 56; Meltzer, supra note 32, at 137 (describing the IMF's debt policy
as tantamount to "ordering up a policy of mutual [economic] contraction"); Purcell,
supra note 2, at 668-72; Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1-3.
77 L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 87; Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 131; Lissakers,
supra note 56, at 172.
78 But see sources cited supra note 72. For a discussion of the debt crisis from the
vantage point of creditors, see Trouvain, International Indebtedness, MGMT. INT'L
REV., Fall 1984, at 4.
71 Meissner, Debt: Reform Without Government, 56 FOREIGN PoL'Y 81, 81
(1984).
80 Id. at 82.
81 See Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 140; Broad, supra note 14, at A25, col. 1; see
also Bailey & Watkins, supra note 8, at A19, col. 2; Fishlow, supra note 20, at A19,
cols. 1-2. The problems caused by interest payments on government indebtedness have
recently been discussed in relation to the United States national debt. See, e.g., P. SI-
MON, supra note 11, at 88-103. Senator Simon notes (speaking of the United States
national debt) that the interest on a national debt forces interest rates up and at the
same time requires an increase in taxes. This has resulted in the "most massive redis-
tribution of wealth in the history of nations." Id. at 92-93 (paraphrasing a comment by
Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas). Chronic national indebtedness and high interest
rates have a similar effect on any nation. See Roett, supra note 3, at 717.
82 Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 129-31, 140; Meissner, supra note 79, at 82-83;
Bailey & Watkins, supra note 8, at A19, cols. 3-4; Rockefeller, supra note 8, at El5,
col. 1. An additional obligation often placed upon the debtor nation (usually as a condi-
tion of a loan by the IMF) is implementation of an austerity program. See L. MALKIN,
supra note 8, at 87; Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 130; see also W. GREIDER, supra note
36, at 520-21. These programs are often implemented through reduction of imports
with the intention of achieving a favorable trade surplus and thus gaining enough for-
eign exchange to service debt obligations. This policy becomes counterproductive, how-
ever, when too many nations apply it simultaneously. As the overall level of imports
falls, debtor nations cannot find buyers for their exports and hence fail to earn ade-
quate foreign exchange. Meltzer, supra note 32, at 138.
88 The net loan amount equals the amount of credit extended less the repayments
on existing loans. Kuczynski, Latin American Debt: Act Two, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 17, 20
(1983). Private commercial banks have reduced the net flow of capital to Latin
America at a time when greater flows are needed. Roett, supra note 3, at 697-98; see
also Henry, supra note 6, at 29; Broad, supra note 14, at A25, col. 4; Silk, supra note
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finite, any increased commitment to debt rescheduling must result in
proportionate decreases in new lending8 and trade financing 5 Al-
though lending continues on a limited basis, 6 new loans are linked to
debt rescheduling; 7 the added capital is thus committed to servicing the
debt.88 Beyond the cutback in trade financing, this lack of capital inhib-
its the industrial development which is needed to eventually retire the
debt by means of economic growth. 9 Moreover, the commitment of
cash by debtor nations to servicing debt reduces funds available for
needed imports and minimizes the potential for industrial development.
Conversely, it also harms developed nations, such as the United States,
which are benefited by trade with Latin American partners.90 Export-
ers in developed countries cannot reach traditional markets in develop-
ing countries because those countries lack the necessary financing to
purchase goods.91
8, at D2, col. 1; Rockefeller, supra note 8, at E15, col. 1.
In 1986-1987, Bank of Boston considered Mexico such a bad credit risk that it
decided against lending any new money. Bank of Boston reconsidered, however, follow-
ing the intervention of Federal Reserve officials and other banks, including Citicorp.
McCoy & Truell, supra note 10, at 26, col. 2.
"' The reduction of net new lending in 1982 led directly to the inability of Brazil
to meet its principal repayments. Similar problems have plagued Venezuela, Chile, Ec-
uador, Peru and Uruguay, as well as Mexico and Argentina. Kuczynski, supra note
83, at 21, 26.
85 Lenders, particularly smaller banks, have reduced their lines of credit for ex-
port and import financing. Id. at 21.
6 During 1983-1986, Brazil paid over $40 billion in interest to its foreign bank
creditors, yet it was unable to obtain any fresh loans. In the same period, Brazil, Mex-
ico, Argentina, and Venezuela together paid a total of $120 billion in interest, over a
third of the face value of their debts, while they received less than $9 billion in new
loans from private banks. Henry, supra note 6, at 29.
87 See, e.g., Rotberg, supra note 10; see also Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 131.
8' In extreme cases loans are specifically designated as "recycling loans." These
serve to finance consumption and only postpone default. D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1,
at 55.
89 For a discussion of this proposition, see Holden, International: More Debt or
Investment?, U.S. BANKER, Oct. 1985, at 76; see also Fine, supra note 66, at 2, col. 3;
Bailey & Watkins, supra note 8, at A19, col. 2; Rockefeller, supra note 8, at El5, col.
1. But see Horowitz, supra note 66, at 2A, col. 5.
90 See W. GREIDER, supra note 36, at 521; Meltzer, supra note 6, at 5-6; see also
supra notes 12 & 14. Additionally, such economic troubles in Mexico have a direct
effect on United States employment. Treasury Secretary Regan has pointed out that
one out of every eight jobs in United States manufacturing depends on exports and that
four out of every five new jobs in recent years were the result of new exports. It has
been estimated that every $1 billion in exports represents 24,000 jobs in the United
States. See D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 12 (author paraphrasing Secretary Re-
gan's views); see also P. SIMON, supra note 11, at 98-99; Broad, supra note 14, at
A25, col. 5. It also should be noted that world markets are generally inhospitable to the
goods that Latin America must export in order to earn enough foreign exchange to
meet its debt service obligations. Roett, supra note 3, at 698.
" This is the underlying rationale for countertrade. See infra text accompanying
notes 111-25. See also Kuttner, The Costs of Bearing Down on the Third World, Bus.
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2.3. Debt and United States Trade
Because Latin American nations rely heavily on industrial devel-
opment and increased exports to create economic growth,92 locating and
maintaining markets for Latin American goods is essential to alleviat-
ing the debt problem. However, because programs calling for in-
creased exports are generally accompanied by the required implementa-
tion of a program of national austerity,94 a large number of nations are
immediately eliminated as export purchasers. This occurs because those
nations with austerity programs in place are forced to decrease im-
ports95 and are, therefore, eliminated as potential export purchasers. 6
As a result these exports will have to be *absorbed by developed nations
such as the United States.97 From the standpoint of the United States
and other nations importing Latin American goods, there exists the po-
tential for a serious trade imbalance. Because funds that a debtor na-
tion would ordinarily use to import goods from developed nations,
thereby offsetting the developed nations' own imports,98 are devoted to
servicing debt, a net trade imbalance results.99
WK., July 28, 1986, at 16.
92 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
' Debtor nations require export surpluses if they are to repay their loans without
simply borrowing more to do so. The more the debt grows, the faster net exports need
to grow. Meltzer, supra note 6, at 3; see also Hormats, supra note 7, at 476 (warning
that in many countries debt service payments are growing more rapidly than export
earnings and greatly exceed new capital inflows).
"' The extension of additional loans and grants is often conditioned on the success-
ful implementation of such an austerity program. See supra note 82; L. MALKIN,
supra note 8, at 87; Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 130; Meltzer, supra note 32 (discuss-
ing IMF policy); Purcell, supra note 2, at 670-72 (questioning the effectiveness of
implementing austerity programs).
95The imposition of import restrictions in response to IMF policy inadvertently
creates incentives for domestic producers to seek alternatives to currency-based transac-
tions, e.g., countertrade. See UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1766,
ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF BARTER AND COUNTERTRADE TRANSACTIONS ON
U.S. INDUSTRIES 40 (1985) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT].
9' See Meltzer, supra note 32.
17 See P. SIMON, supra note 11, at 98-103 (reviewing the current predicament of
United States trade policy); see also Kilborn, U.S. Trade Deficit Set Record in 1984,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1985, at Al, col. 3.
98 Lack of trade finance hampers a developing nation's production of exports as
well as its purchase of imports. Not only is a nation unable to pay for its imports, it is
also unable to purchase raw materials for its export industries. The net result is usually
an increased reliance on barter. See infra text accompanying notes 111-25.
99 See Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 140. This problem has generally been treated
as part of the overall imbalance of United States trade. Recently, pressure has increased
to either achieve trade parity or to end United States free trade policies. It is generally
agreed that the asymmetry in United States trade policy must be corrected, See P. SI-
MON, supra note 11, at 101-03. The President's Commission on Industrial Competi-
tiveness has noted that "[firagmented trade policy . . . seriously limits [the United
States'] ability to respond to growing volume and complexity of international trade."
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These trends ultimately result in the loss of reciprocal trading
partners for developed nations such as the United States and increased
pressure for United States protectionist measures; the application of
which will make it more difficult for debtors to service their debts.10°
For example, in 1984, economic growth in the United States slowed. 01
The United States had absorbed most of the recent export growth from
developing nations, but the economic downswing intensified demands
for greater restrictions on inexpensive foreign imports as a means of
protecting United States industry. ° Such protectionist measures close
the few markets which remain open to debtor nations and are necessary
to their economic growth. Ultimately, it is the creditor who feels the
strain, because the inability of debtor nations to obtain foreign ex-
change for their goods increases the need to engage in further debt
rescheduling.'
3. SOLUTIONS AND INCENTIVES FOR LIMITING THE DEBT CRISIS
Although the debt crisis is chronic and no single solution is likely
to cure the world's credit ills,' a variety of strategies have arisen to
deal, at least in part, with the problem of Latin American debt.10 5 The
Report of the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness (1985), vol. 1, p.
39.
100 See Fox & Cooney, supra note 11, at 74-75, 78; see also Hormats, supra note
7, at 476 (warning that in many countries debt service payments are growing more
rapidly than export earnings and greatly exceed new capital inflows); Meltzer, supra
note 6, at 3.
101 See Hormats, supra note 7, at 473; see also Kilborn, supra note 97.
102 See Hormats, supra note 7, at 473.
103 See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text; see also L. MALKIN, supra
note 8, at 89.
104 See Heinemann, supra note 21, at 6, col. 1; Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 143;
Kuczynski, supra note 83, at 29-30; Makin, supra note 21. But see Bolin & Del
Canto, supra note 10, at 1102-05; Alpern & Emerson, supra note 21, at A27, cols. 2-3;
Beim, supra note 63, at A25, cols. 1-2.
105 See, e.g., Henry, supra note 6, at 25, 28 (commenting on Brazil's proposal to
convert part of its foreign debt into long-term bonds); Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 137-
49 (discussing "deferral schemes" and debt-for-equity options); Riding, Brazil Has a
New Plan for Converting Its Debt, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1987, at D2, col. 4 (discuss-
ing the Brazilian bond proposal); Makin, supra note 72, at A23, col. 2 (proposing
creation of a multinational institution which would facilitate the secondary debt
market).
In April 1987, Treasury Secretary James A. Baker adopted a "menu of alterna-
tives" approach to the debt problem. Baker, at the semiannual meeting of the IMF's
Interim Committee called on commercial banks to develop a "menu of alternative new
money options" for debtor nations. See Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 132; see also
Kilborn, supra note 4, at D4, col. 6.
Most recently, Mexico and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company announced
plans to exchange existing bank loans for marketable Mexican bonds at an estimated
rate of 60 cents on the dollar. See, e.g., Moffett & Truell, Mexican Aides Estimate
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most intelligent strategies do not seek simply to eliminate the debt by a
single stroke;' 6 rather, they attempt to stimulate growth either by les-
sening the debtor nation's current repayment obligations or by creating
incentives for investment. 10 7 The cycle of rescheduling alone will not
solve the worldwide debt crisis.'08
A long-term solution to the international debt crisis can only occur
when debtors are able to return permanently to the marketplace and to
borrow and repay loans in a normal, healthy fashion without either the
intervention of debt committees or the granting of conditional loans
from international institutions. 9 For this to occur, debtor nations must
earn enough dollars from exports to pay for imports of goods, to pay
Result of Debt Plan, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1988, at 23, col. 1. The bonds offer two
principal attractions to investors: (1) they would pay interest at a higher rate than the
existing debt, and (2) their principal would be backed by zero-coupon United States
Treasury bonds as a guarantee against default. Farnsworth, supra note 4, at Al, col. 1,
D3, col. 1; Guenther, Here Are Main Points of Plan for Mexico to Reduce Its Debt by
Billions of Dollars, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1987, at 6, col. 1. Commentators initially
greeted the plan as a major breakthrough. See, e.g., A New Handle on Third World
Debt, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1988, at A18, col. 1; A Breakthrough on Latin Debt, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 2, 1988, § 1, at 22, col. 1; Bailey & Hill, Regional Banks May Be Eager
for Mexican Plan, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1987, at 2, col. 1; Rohter, Latin America
Hails Proposal on Mexican Debt, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1987, at D3, col. 1. Subse-
quent analysis, however, suggests that this proposal is likely to be no more than one of
the several options available in the "menu of alternatives" scheme. See, e.g., Truell,
Some Banks Are at Odds with Mexico, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1988, at 2, col. 3; Mexico's
Debt Plan, Will It Work?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 1; Some Big
Banks Plan to Shun Mexican Plan, supra note 72.
106 For example, it has been suggested that the loans should simply be written-off
at a loss. The debtor nations would then be able to start anew without having to con-
tend with the burden of their former debts. Similarly, a debtors' cartel has been sug-
gested which would simply declare a moratorium on interest payments. Although these
solutions may possess theoretical appeal, they are impractical. One major obstacle to
simply wiping out the obligations of debtor nations is that their creditors may have
insufficient reserves to cover losses. See D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 232-33; Kutt-
ner, supra note 91; Makin, supra note 21; see also supra notes 69-72 and accompany-
ing text.
An additional objection to simple elimination of the debts is jurisprudential. Re-
gardless of the economic hardships that the initial loan agreements are now creating in
debtor nations, these agreements represent legal obligations entered into by mutual con-
sent. Allowing a write-off would diminish respect for all international contracts. For a
discussion of the western legal notion of contracts as moral obligations, see C. FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE 14-17 (1981); see also Roett, supra note 3, at 714-15; Rocke-
feller, supra note 8, at E15, col. 4; Beim, supra note 63, at A25, col. 4. But see D.
DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 233 (stating that "[mlost of the shilly-shally in
rescheduling loans [is] simply a shell game to preserve legal fictions").
.07 See, e.g., Kuczynski, supra note 83, at 27-30; Meltzer, supra note 32; Roett,
supra note 3, at 714-20; see also DeWitt, supra note 76. Laulan, A New Approach to
International Indebtedness, BANKER, June 1983, at 25.
"I6 See Kuczynski, supra note 83, at 27-29. But see Bolin & Del Canto, supra
note 10, at 1103.
10" See Meltzer, supra note 32, at 138, 143; see also Kuczynski, supra note 1, at
137-40.
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interest on the outstanding debt and to finance net capital flow. 10
3.1. The Rise of Barter and Countertrade
When a debtor nation lacks the capital necessary for trade, it will
often rely upon international barter or countertrade. In the past few
years, barter has become a significant trade practice in virtually all
Latin American countries."' 1 The use of barter avoids the need for a
monetary exchange in transactions for goods. There are various trading
agreements, 12 generically termed barter, by which such non-monetary
exchanges can be entered into: international barter,
11 ' swaps,114
counterpurchase, 1 5 compensation" 6 and switch trading. 17 There are
several benefits derived from reliance on barter, including the preserva-
tion of cash reserves, 1 8 an improvement in the balance of trade 1 ' and
110 See Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 138; Meltzer, supra note 32, at 138, 143; see
also Bailey & Watkins, supra note 8, at A19, col. 2.
111 See ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 38-45, 54-56. The official policies and
laws mandating or encouraging countertrade vary from nation to nation. Countertrade
will arise even where there is no governmental policy mandating it. For example, al-
though Mexico does not require countertrade, its December 1982 "Exchange Controls
Decree" established needed legal standards for countertrade. Id. at 55 (citing Mexican
Federal Official Gazette, Dec. 1982).
112 The use of countertrade raises a myriad of policy considerations as well as
both domestic and international legal issues. For a general survey of these aspects of
countertrade, see McVey, Countertrade: Commercial Practices, Legal Issues and Pol-
icy Dilemmas, 16 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1984).
113 International barter is usually defined as the direct exchange of one commodity
or product for another without the use of cash. See M. GERSHMAN, supra note 33, at
123; Lochner, supra note 30, at 729-30.
1"4 Swaps are essentially a type of barter in which similar products are exchanged
in different locations to save on transportation costs. M. GERSHMAN, supra note 33, at
123.
115 Counterpurchase agreements are a form of parallel barter that involves offset-
ting deliveries of unrelated goods. Each party usually pays cash for the goods or ser-
vices received but agrees to make the counterpurchase. For example, in 1979, Yugosla-
via insisted that General Motors buy $4 million worth of its cutting tools as a condition
to Yugoslavia's purchase of $12 million worth of engines from General Motors. M.
GERSHMAN, supra note 33, at 123; Lochner, supra note 30, at 730.
.16 Also known as "buyback," "offtake" and "coproduction," compensation in-
volves the repayment of the original purchase through the sale of a resultant product.
For example, a company sells factory machinery to a debtor nation and receives part of
the factory's output as its compensation. Because payment is deferred and is in whole-
sale goods, the dollar value of most compensation agreements is very high. See M.
GERSHMAN, supra note 33, at 123-24; Lochner, supra note 30, at 730-31.
11 "Switch trading" or "clearings" involves a bilateral trade-and-payment agree-
ment under which country Y does not actually pay for the value of goods it imports
from country X, but, rather, gives country X a credit on a clearing account. Goods
moving in the opposite direction result in offsetting credits to country Y. See M.
GERSHMAN, supra note 33, at 124-25; see also Lochner, supra note 30, at 731-32.
118 See ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 121.
119 Because imports are tied to exports, usually through a counterpurchase agree-
ment, a trade deficit will not result. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
19881
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
the expedition of industrial expansion."'
The international debt crisis has made barter and countertrade a
growth industry with over $600 billion worth of transactions occurring
annually. 21 The economic difficulties that have arisen in many debtor
nations have led those nations to utilize the only leverage available to
them - their power as importers.1 22 Many debtors saw countertrade as
an opportunity both to halt the deterioration of their trade deficits by
balancing every transaction, and to assure imports vital to the function-
ing of their economies.1 21 Such proposals were accepted by trading
partners out of fear of losing a share of valuable markets.1 24 Most
countries with debt problems have insisted on paying for goods and
services with some form of barter and have often demanded as a condi-
tion of trade that foreign vendors accept payment through
countertrade.
125
3.1.1. Problems Associated with Barter
Although the widespread practice of international barter does not
offer a solution to the underlying problems of world debt, it can allevi-
ate many of the immediate and distressing symptoms of the crisis.
126
Nonetheless, countertrade has in fact been viewed with hostility within
the United States. 27 Many United States commentators, as well as the
Reagan administration, argue that countertrade is contrary to the prin-
ciples of the open trading system"'8 and that countertrade tends to
120 See Lochner, supra note 30, at 745. See also M. GERSHMAN, supra note 33,
at 6, 24-26, 115-17, 140-41.
121 M. GERSHMAN, supra note 33, at 1. These figures include international but
not domestic barter transactions.
122 See Glynn, Whatever Happened to the Debtors' Cartel, INSTITUTIONAL IN-
VESTOR, July 1986, at 228; see also L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 88-89.
121 By insisting on countertrade, debtor nations, and in some instances private
firms, have channeled the financial pressure of debt repayment back upon their credi-
tors. ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 40. In addition, developing countries are using
countertrade to improve their competitive position, to increase exports and to obtain
hard currency. Id. at 121.
12 Western firms were compelled to comply with countertrade demands of debtor
nations for fear of losing their share of shrinking markets in non-oil-producing coun-
tries after 1979. "Competition among western multinational firms and the ability of
these companies to adjust to new situations and absorb inefficiencies helped proliferate
international countertrade." Id. at 40. See generally H. COHEN, You CAN NEGOTIATE
ANYTHING 55-58 (1980) (discussing the power of competition).
125 Lochner, supra note 30, at 736.
128 See, e.g., Maidenberg, Bartering Aids Poor Nations, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1983, at D1, col. 3.
127 See Lochner, supra note 30, at 742-45.
12 Countertrade: Group of 30 Says Practice More Prevalent, More Beneficial
Than Generally Recognized, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 320 (1986) [herein-
after Countertrade]; see also Lochner, supra note 30, at 743 n.103.
[Vol. 10:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss1/4
LATIN AMERICAN DEBT
shrink and distort international trade markets."' 9 Moreover, several
United States critics complain that the importation of goods by a debtor
nation through barter bypasses its foreign exchange reserves, and
thereby minimizes the accumulation of balances considered available
for use in servicing debt. 30
It is true that, by insisting on countertrade, debtor nations channel
financial pressures imposed upon them through debt obligations back to
their creditors or creditor nations."3 This reflects, however, the interre-
lated nature of the world debt crisis, rather than any problem unique to
countertrade. 3 2 If United States economic policy is to respond to the
needs of Latin America, it must recognize the economic realities that
make countertrade a necessity.'3 Most Latin American nations that
engage in wide-scale countertrade do so because of limited hard cur-
rency reserves, undervalued national currency or overvalued currency
in exporting nations.' Countertrade has become an indispensable
method by which debtor nations obtain essential goods3 5 without
which their economies would suffer further stagnation, and industrial
growth and development would be prevented.' 6
A further argument against United States recognition of a legiti-
mate role for countertrade is the assertion that countertrade is too com-
129 See, e.g., U.S. Firms at Conference Given Warning Not to Violate U.S. Cus-
toms, Trade Laws, 20 Int'l Trade Reporter's U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 10, at
393 (1983) [hereinafter U.S. Firms Given Warning]. Objections to countertrade arise
not only from concerns about enforcement difficulties and possible distortion of trade,
but also from the political nature of traditional countertrade partners. Traditionally,
most international barter agreements involved nations such as Eastern Bloc countries
which lacked sufficient dollars to purchase western goods and technology. As a result,
barter played, and continues to play, an important role in meeting the needs of commu-
nist countries. Complaints over countertrade were thus based on political and ideologi-
cal concerns. See H. COHEN, supra note 124, at 156-61; M. GERSHMAN, supra note
33, at 5, 117-21.
3' For example,, Robert V. Roosa, a partner of Brown Brothers, Harriman &
Co., a commercial bank which provides banking and investment services, stated,
"[i]mported goods obtained in effect through a direct exchange for a country's exporta-
ble goods would bypass the country's foreign exchange reserves and in that way mini-
mize the accumulation of balances considered available for debt servicing." Counter-
trade, supra note 128, at 320.
131 ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 40.
132 See supra notes 74-103 and accompanying text.
133 See Lochner, supra note 30, at 743 n.103.
134 See id. at 736-37.
131 See ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 41 (listing reasons for rise of counter-
trade); Countertrade, supra note 128, at 320 (noting that countertrade can play a lim-
ited helpful role); McVey, supra note 30, at 197-200 (surveying the needs served by
the rise of countertrade); Maidenberg, supra note 126 (describing usefulness of
countertrade).
13. Moreover, such conditions tend to produce political instability. See L. MAL-
KIN, supra note 8, at 87; Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 136-37; see also supra note 20.
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plex to be properly overseen . 3 7 United States trade officials claim that
it is impossible to determine which imports are the consequence of
countertrade."'8 Currently, the level of United States imports resulting
from countertrade can be verified only to the extent that private firms
voluntarily provide details about their countertrade deals.139 Critics are
concerned that unreported countertrade could ultimately lead to a
breakdown in United States customs and trade laws. 4"
3.1.2. A Domestic Model as a Solution
Barter exchanges within the United States present many of the
same inherent control problems as international barter. 4 ' Yet, in enact-
ing the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),'42
Congress recognized that barter was an entrenched practice which
would only expand in the future. Section 311 of TEFRA requires do-
mestic trade exchanges to report each barter transaction among individ-
ual clients and to report barter transactions by corporations on an an-
nual basis.' 43 Additionally, section 311 gives barter organizations
"third-party record-keeper status," similar to that enjoyed by banks,
brokerages and credit card companies.' 44
Section 311 of TEFRA provides a suitable model for import/ex-
port legislation that would resolve the problems raised by the prolifera-
tion of countertrade.' 45 Adoption of legislation which treated interna-
tional transactions in a manner similar to that by which TEFRA treats
domestic barter would overcome many of the problems which hinder
the creation of a formal United States international barter policy. Basi-
cally, an adequate international barter statute would require: (1) corpo-
11 Lochner, supra note 30, at 743 n.106.
1-8 Id. at 743.
139 See, e.g., id.; U.S. Firms Given Warning, supra note 129, at 393 (warning
countertraders to be particularly cognizant of United States laws governing imports).
140 See Zarin, Countertrade and the Law, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
235 (1984).
141 See generally M. GERSHMAN, supra note 33, at 35-45 (discussing domestic
problems posed by barter and its regulation by the Internal Revenue Service).
142 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
TEFRA]; see also M. GERSHMAN, supra note 33, at 35.
" TEFRA § 311(a)(1) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6045(a)-(c) (1982)).
144 Id. § 311(b) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a)(3)(G) (1982)); see also M.
GERSHMAN, supra note 33, at 35-36.
146 The problem was summed up, for example, by a senior Assistant United
States Trade Representative who stated "[i]f all companies start setting up countertrade
operations, the whole thing could become difficult to unravel. How can we maintain a
sensible commercial policy if it becomes less and less clear what's happening out there."
Lochner, supra note 30, at 743 n.106.
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rations or international traders dealing in barter transactions to report
each barter transaction on an annual basis," and (2) corporations and
traders engaging in barter to assume a "third-party record-keeper sta-
tus," similar to that possessed by banks, brokerages and credit card
companies with respect to domestic exchanges.
1 47
The United States has taken an initial step towards this type of
regulation by formally cautioning United States firms that engage in
countertrade to be aware of potential customs and trade law viola-
tions. 48 However, only legislative action will enable the United States
to properly control countertrade and to effectuate a rational barter pol-
icy towards Latin America.1 49 Unfortunately, the United States has
continued to express publicly its unwillingness to establish any formal
countertrade policy. 50
3.2. Debt-for-Equity Exchanges
Debt-for-equity exchanges 5 ' originally arose as a specialized form
of countertrade.' 52 Economist Allan Meltzer first recognized that debt-
for-equity exchanges offered a unique solution to the debt crisis. Ac-
cording to the plan originally developed by Meltzer, a debtor nation
would exchange partial ownership in a national monopoly or other na-
tional holding, 53 and, in return, the creditor would retire a propor-
tional amount of the outstanding debt.154 The exchange would reduce
14 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
148 See, e.g., U.S. Firms Given Warning, supra note 129, at 393.
149 It should be noted that a variety of legislation has been introduced in Congress
to deal with various countertrade issues. However, thus far, the bills deal with counter-
trade only from the standpoint of national security or protection of domestic agricul-
tural producers. See id.
150 See, e.g., ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 121; Lochner, supra note 30, at 743
n.103. See generally Oh, The Need for a United States Countertrade Policy, 7 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 113 (1985).
151 See supra note 31 and sources cited therein.
151 Specifically, debt-for-equity exchanges evolved out of countertrade involving
currency. For example, one United States company sold breeding swine to a Latin
American purchaser for pesos because the buyer had no United States dollars. The
United States company then used the pesos to purchase sugar in the buyer's country
and sold the sugar to a Chicago food processor for dollars. The next evolutionary step
occurred when some companies began to use countertrade to collect debts. For example,
when a foreign debtor lacked dollars to pay a United States creditor, the creditor ac-
cepted payment in a foreign currency, used the currency to purchase foreign goods and
resold the foreign goods for dollars in the United States. Lochner, supra note 30, at 727
n.5; see also L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 124-25; Meltzer, supra note 32.
153 For example, Brazil has over 600 state-owned companies, which include its 25
largest nonfinancial companies and several banks. Henry, supra note 6, at 28.
154 See Defusing the Debt Bomb the Less Painful Way, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1985,
at 1, col. 5; Meltzer, supra note 32, at 143.
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the interest burden on the debtor nation without the debtor having to
expend foreign currency. Moreover, the currency retained could be
used for industrial development or trade financing. 55 The creditor
would benefit by having an opportunity either to convert a depreciating
asset into a stable asset or simply to divest itself of unwanted debt,
albeit at a discount.156
3.2.1. Types of Debt-for-Equity Transactions
Debt-for-equity exchanges can be structured in several ways. As
originally envisioned, a debtor nation gives the creditor a minority stock
position in a government-owned industry; for example, a petrochemical
plant or a hydroelectric utility. 57 The rate of exchange, i.e., the value
of the equity the debtor nation is willing to exchange for retirement of
a given amount of debt, is established by means of negotiations. 58 Rec-
ognizing the impaired nature of the debt's value, the creditor generally
is willing to acquiesce in the debtor nation's insistence on an exchange
rate of less than 100 cents per dollar of debt. 59 An additional incentive,
therefore, is created for the debtor to exchange debt.
An alternative type of transaction involves the exchange of the
debtor nation's own currency for a proportional amount of outstanding
debt. 60 Again, the debt is discounted, and the bank receives less than
... See Meltzer, supra note 32, at 143; see also Berg, U.S. Banks Swap Latin
Debt: Concerns Get Equity Stake, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1986, at Dl, col. 3; Defusing
the Debt Bomb the Less Painful Way, supra note 154; infra note 169 and accompany-
ing text.
156 See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
's Meltzer, supra note 32, at 143. For example, Bankers Trust Company ex-
changed $60 million in outstanding debt in Chile for a 51% interest in a pension man-
agement concern and a 97% ownership in a Chilean insurance company. Berg, supra
note 155; see also examples discussed infra note 167.
1"8 For example, the current Mexican system determines the value to be offered
for the debt according to the benefits the transaction offers to Mexico's development.
Negotiations to determine the rate of exchange are the responsibility of the Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit. Operating Manual for Debt Capitalization and Public
Debt Substitution by Investment (Mexico) [hereinafter Operating Manual], reprinted
in Council of the Americas Debt-Equity Seminar Workbook at V-8 & Annex C (Oct.
1987) (available from Council of the Americas, New York, N.Y.). The Operating
Manual constitutes the official version of procedures to be employed by various agen-
cies of the Mexican Government in approving debt-equity exchanges.
159 The creditor's only alternative is to implement continued rescheduling by loan-
ing yet more money to repay interest on earlier loans. Debt-for-equity exchanges avoid
this situation and give the creditor an asset whose value is less likely to be diminished
by inflation. Meltzer, supra note 32, at 138, 143.
160 Interest and principal payments on debts are usually made in the currency of
the lender bank's nation or in an internationally accepted currency such as the United
States dollar. See generally D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 20, 37-40, 144-45, 229-31
(discussing the dominance of the United States dollar and the difficulties arising there-
from). In debt-for-equity exchanges, the debt is usually exchanged for the borrower's
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100 cents per dollar. The equity received is initially in the form of
national currency which the bank can then use to invest in enterprises
within the debtor nation.' Banks, however, are generally not inter-
ested in acquiring equity holdings in Latin America;162 therefore, the
exchanges often involve a third party, usually a multinational
corporation.'6
Rather than exchanging debt for investment capital in the debtor
nation, many banks have begun to sell their financial interest in the
debtor nation to third parties at a discount.' 64 The third parties then
exchange the newly purchased interest for a discounted amount of the
currency or an equivalent credit. See Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 133. This approach
has been criticized for its potentially inflationary effects. See Recent Development, In-
ternational Debt: Debt-to-Equity, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507, 515 (1987).
161 Berg, supra note 155; see also Argentina Plans to Swap Part of Its Debt for
Equity, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1986, at 26, col. 1 (reporting plan to issue bonds in long-
term development projects in Argentina). Another alternative is to offer some form of
shares in long-term development in the debtor nation. See Alpern & Emerson, supra
note 21, at A27, col. 4 (proposing "Good Neighbor" bonds).
162 However, in one transaction, Citicorp acquired 20% of the shares of a Brazil-
ian subsidiary of Celanese Corporation in a public for private sector exchange. Berg,
supra note 155, at D5, col. 1.
More accurately, United States banks are limited in their permissible participation
in foreign nonfinancial institutions. Under the provisions of the Federal Reserve
Board's Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1987), United States banking organizations
can hold no more than 20% of the shares of nonfinancial companies. Id. § 211.5. How-
ever, in light of the interest United States banking organizations have expressed in
acquiring controlling investments under debt-for-equity exchange programs, the Board
has proposed a more liberal rule. See Final Rule and Request for Comment, Docket
No. R-0610, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,912 (1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(0) (pro-
posed Aug. 12, 1987). The amended rule would allow United States banking organiza-
tions to acquire as much as 100% of the ownership of a foreign nonfinancial company
under the following conditions: (1) the nonfinancial company must be in the process of
being transferred from public to private ownership, (2) the company must be located in
a heavily indebted developing country, (3) the shares are acquired through a debt-for-
equity exchange, (4) the shares are held by the bank holding company or its subsidiar-
ies and (5) the ownership interest must be divested within five years from the date of
acquisition, unless the Board extends the time for good cause, but in no event may
ownership continue longer than 10 years. Id. at 30,914.
For a critical response to the Board's action and a call for increased liberalization,
see Letter from the New York Clearing House to William W. Wiles, Secretary, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, app. at 1-11 (Sept. 30, 1987) (available
from The Freedom of Information Office, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Clearing House Letter].
"6s Clearing House Letter, supra note 162; Ollard, The Debt Swappers,
EUROMONEY, Aug. 1986, at 67. In addition, by involving third parties, banks can
charge a broker's fee for setting up and structuring the debt-for-equity exchange. Sev-
eral banks and brokers, in fact, have earned sizable profits through this process. More-
over, these fees can help banks to offset the discounting of their loans. See L. MALKIN,
supra note 8, at 126; Berg, supra note 155.
16" Due to this type of debt-for-equity exchange and other forms of debt trading, a
thriving secondary market for debt has developed. See Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 131,
134; see also Debt-Equity Swaps, supra note 31, at 2.
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debtor's national currency'"5 which they invest within the debtor na-
tion.'"6 Generally, this type of exchange involves a multinational corpo-
ration which has a subsidiary in the debtor nation or is interested in
expanding into that nation. Instead of investing United States dollars
directly in the subsidiary, the multinational is able, in effect, to
purchase investment capital at a discount from creditor banks. 6
3.2.2. Benefits of Debt-for-Equity Exchanges
Debt-for-equity transactions alleviate the burdens created by ex-
tensive debt in a number of ways. First, the debtor nation is able to
retire substantial portions of its outstanding debt"68 and, thereby, re-
duce interest payments. 6 Second, debt-for-equity exchanges encourage
and facilitate much needed foreign investment in debtor nations.'
70
Multinationals are given a means to invest in or setup subsidiaries at a
discounted rate, but more importantly, the debt can be converted into a
form of capital that stimulates investment and encourages economic
185 These exchanges are generally arranged by a bank, although not necessarily
by the creditor bank. In many instances, the banks do not sell their own debt but rather
broker debt-for-equity exchanges for corporate clients. Such was the case when the
Bank of Boston facilitated an exchange involving a corporate client interested in buying
equipment for its Argentine plant. See infra note 167. The fact that brokerage fees can
be as much as $1 million for every $100 million of debt exchanged raises troubling
possibilities. See L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 126; cf. Miller, When Swaps Unwind,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1986, at 165 (examining the risk involved in interest
rate exchanges).
The price that the investor receives from the debtor nation is dependent upon the
nature of the enterprises in which the investor intends to invest. See Clearing House
Letter, supra note 162, app. at 2 nn.3-4; see also infra notes 198-200 and accompany-
ing text.
166 See, e.g., Argentina Plans to Swap Part of Its Debt for Equity, supra note
161; President Reveals Plans for Bilateral Trade, Investments Talks with Mexico, 3
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1061 (1986).
167 Berg, supra note 155; L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 124-25. Nissan Motors
recently bought $60 million in Mexican debt from 18 United States banks for approxi-
mately $40 million. Nissan then sold the debt to the Mexican Central Bank for $54
million in Mexican pesos which Nissan then invested in its Mexican subsidiary. In
another instance, Bank of Boston arranged for an Argentine corporate client to buy
Argentine Government debt and exchange it for Argentine currency which the client
then used to purchase equipment for its Argentine plant. L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at
126; Ollard, supra note 163, at 69; Berg, supra note 155, at D5, col. 2.
168 Berg, supra note 155; Meltzer, supra note 32.
189 If debtor nations converted some of their loans to equity, they would require
less foreign currency for servicing debt and could use their financial resources to in-
crease productivity and exports. Meltzer, supra note 32, at 138, 143; see also Clearing
House Letter, supra note 162, app. at 1-4; Debt-Equity Swaps, supra note 31, at 1.
For a discussion of the beneficial effect of debt-for-equity exchanges on the debt-service
ratio, see Clearing House Letter, supra note 162, app. at 6 & nn.6-7.
170 See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
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growth.17 ' Third, the banks are offered a manageable way to realize
the losses occasioned by their previous extension of financially question-
able, but nonetheless expedient,1 2 loans to debtor nations.Y77 Fourth,
the losses are realized in a rational and incremental fashion, and some
of the outstanding debt is either recovered or exchanged for equity.Y17
Finally, where the exchange involves trading debt for a government
holding, the process of privatization"
5 is advanced.17 1
3.2.3. Traditional Barriers and Novel Reform - The Mexican
Model
Early proponents of debt-for-equity exchanges were concerned
that barriers erected by Latin American nations to limit foreign invest-
ment would curtail use of this type of transaction. 1 7 For example,
1 For a description of exchanges that generated additional capital in Mexico and
Argentina, see supra note 167. For a general discussion of Latin America's need for
such recapitalization, see Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 16, at 267-73; Hormats,
supra note 7, at 473-78; Mexico Opens Several Key Industry Sectors to Direct Invest-
ment Participation by Foreign Capital, 20 Int'l Trade Reporter's U.S. Export Weekly
(BNA) No. 20, at 667 (1984) [hereinafter Mexico Opens Key Sectors]; Ollard, supra
note 163, at 69-71.
Latin America will ultimately solve its economic difficulties only by attracting in-
vestment capital to fuel its economic growth. During past periods of high external bor-
rowing, large amounts of capital left Latin America. Debt-for-equity exchanges re-
present a means of facilitating the return of this capital from abroad. Kuczynski, supra
note 1, at 138-40, 143-44; see also Silk, supra note 8, at D2, col. 3 (discussing
problems caused by the outflow of capital from developing countries).
172 See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
17' Because the value of the loans is already impaired, the banks ultimately cannot
avoid realizing losses; they can only seek to do so in the most palatable way. Partial
repayment of the loans can minimize losses before further deterioration in value ensues.
See D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 233; Meltzer, supra note 32, at 138, 143; see also
Guenther, supra note 105, at 6, cols. 1-2 (discussing similar benefits offered by the
Mexican debt-for-bond plan).
174 See supra text accompanying note 156.
17. Privatization is defined as the conversion of state-owned banks and businesses
to private ownership. It is generally believed that privatization enhances competition
and efficiency. Both the International Finance Corporation and the Reagan administra-
tion favor privatization. See Meltzer, supra note 6, at 7. Proposals to sell national
holdings have met with political opposition in debtor nations. In Mexico, for instance,
news of proposed privatization sparked heated debate. See Berg, supra note 155, at D5,
col. 5; Defusing the Debt Bomb the Less Painful Way, supra note 154, at 1, col. 5; see
also L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 125-26 (likening the sale of national industries to
"some surrealistic capitalist fantasy . . . whose . . . hero sells off arms, legs, and much
else to stay alive").
17 For example, Bankers Trust Company recently exchanged approximately $40
million for a 40% interest in the Provida Pension Fund and a 97% interest in the life
insurance company Consorcio Nacional de Seguros. Both companies were previously
owned by the Chilean Government. Bankers Trust Swapping Chile Debt for 2 Firms,
J. Com., Jan. 9, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
177 See generally Fiszman, Foreign Investment Law: Encouragement Versus Re-
straint - Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 8 HASTINGS INT'L &
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Mexico's 1973 Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate
Foreign Investment (Mexican Investment Law)171 limits foreign invest-
ment179 in most sectors of the economy to forty-nine percent ownership
of any enterprise.18 In addition, some investors remain concerned that
Mexico's lack of specific legislative guidelines and statutory rules leaves
them vulnerable to unanticipated policy changes."8 Mexico, however,
has demonstrated a willingness to encourage increased foreign invest-
ment. 82 A variety of Mexican regulations that once restricted foreign
investment have been lifted.' Majority foreign ownership, although
COMP. L. REv. 147, 150-59 (1985) (reviewing the history of Mexican foreign invest-
ment laws and various devices that have been adopted to control foreign investment);
Maviglia, supra note 18, at 290-98 (discussing regulatory barriers encountered by for-
eign investors in Mexico).
1"8 Diario Oficial [D.O.], Mar. 9, 1973 [hereinafter Mexican Investment Law],
reprinted in English in 1 DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, app. 12 (S. Lefler ed. 1987).
This law's purpose was "to promote Mexican investment in order to stimulate a just
and balanced development and consolidate the country's economic independence." Id.
art. 1. This legislation was part of a broader policy aimed at minimizing the role of
foreign capital in Mexico. Implementation of this policy, along with the devaluation of
the Mexican peso in 1976, led to a decline in confidence in Mexico's economic health
and ultimately to near default. Fiszman, supra note 177, at 152.
'" According to Mexican law "foreign investment shall be considered that under-
taken by: I. Foreign corporate bodies; II. Foreign physical persons; III. Foreign eco-
nomic entities without legal personalty; and IV. Mexican business enterprises with ma-
jority foreign capital or in which foreigners are empowered . . . to determine the
management of the business enterprise." Mexican Investment Law, art. 2. See also
Fiszman, supra note 177, at 153-54.
180 Mexican Investment Law, art. 5. The National Commission on Foreign In-
vestment [hereinafter Commission] has authority to approve investment in excess of the
49% limit. Id. The Commission was established by the Mexican Foreign Investment
Law as a cabinet-level group with wide authority to regulate foreign investment. Id.
arts. 11-17. There are, however, some areas of investment that are reserved exclusively
for state ownership. These include oil, gas and basic petrochemicals, nuclear energy,
electricity, railways, radio and telegraphic communications, and certain areas of min-
ing. Id. art. 4; see also Fiszman, supra note 177, at 154-55 & n.35, 162; Maviglia,
supra note 18, at 290-94.
181 Maviglia, supra note 18, at 299. Mexico's investment policy is based upon
administrative guidelines rather than upon legislative measures. The Mexican Presi-
dent has authority to promulgate regulations which explain and provide detailed
precepts for the application of specific laws. MEX. CONsT. art. 89, § 1. No regulations
per se address foreign investment in Mexico. Rather, the Commission has the authority
to issue General Resolutions setting forth standards and requirements for applying the
law. Mexican Investment Law, arts. 12-13; see Fiszman, supra note 177, at 158-59;
Maviglia, supra note 18, at 292; Trevifio, Mexico: The Present Status of Legislation
and Governmental Policies on Direct Foreign Investments, 18 INT'L LAW. 297, 305
(1984). For example, the Commission has authority to rule on debt conversion matters
or to promulgate guidelines to govern debt conversion policy. See Operating Manual,
supra note 158, at V-4.
182 See, e.g., Mexico Opens Key Sectors, supra note 171, at 667.
181 See Fiszman, supra note 177, at 155-56. But see Ollard, supra note 163, at 73
(noting that Mexican pesos generated by these types of investments cannot be converted
back to United States dollars to pay for imported machinery and plant improvements).
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not always encouraged, is now more readily permitted in targeted in-
dustries."' Although the Mexican attitude towards foreign investment
is not uniformly hospitable," 5 vast improvements have been made dur-
ing the past several years.'
8 6
In particular, Mexico's 1984 Guidelines for Foreign Investment
and Objectives for Its Promlilgation (Guidelines)1 87 allow increased in-
vestment of foreign capital within Mexico and, contrary to conventional
Latin American practice, tolerate a loss of domestic control where sub-
stantial economic benefits are expected.'88 The Guidelines stress the at-
tainment of stability and growth through the balancing of foreign ex-
change, the production of competitive imports and the further
integration of Mexico into the international economic community.' 89
Furthermore, the Guidelines acknowledge Mexico's past failure to es-
tablish a consistent policy towards direct foreign investment.1 90
With respect to debt-for-equity exchanges, Mexico, in accordance
with the August 1985 Public Sector Debt Restructuring Agreement, 9 '
184 For example, guidelines promulgated by the Commission now specify priority
activities which may receive up to 100% direct foreign investment. Guidelines for For-
eign Investment and Objectives for Its Promulgation, D.O., Aug. 30, 1984, at 5-6
[hereinafter Guidelines]. These activities include: "production of nonelectric equipment
and machinery, electric machinery and appliances, electronic equipment and devices,
and equipment and material for transportation; metal mechanics; the chemical industry;
other manufacturing industries; advanced technology services; and the hotel industry."
Mavaglia, supra note 18, at 296 (footnotes omitted).
185 For example, disputes involving investment in Mexico must be decided by a
domestic forum. Fiszman, supra note 177, at 157-58.
188 See Maviglia, supra note 18, at 294-98. Moreover, it is generally assumed that
businesses incorporated under the Guidelines could retain majority foreign ownership
even if Mexico returned to a 49% foreign investment limit. See id. at 299 & n.130
(reporting on interviews with foreign investment attorneys).
167 Guidelines, supra note 184.
188 Id. at 4-5; see Maviglia, supra note 18, at 294-95. But see Fiszman, supra
note 177, at 162 (commenting that "this relaxed attitude does not imply an unguarded
door").
189 Guidelines, supra note 184, at 4-5; see Maviglia, supra note 18, at 295.
190 Guidelines, supra note 184, at 5; see Maviglia, supra note 18, at 295.
191 New Restructure Agreements Among Mexican Public Sector Obligors, the
United Mexican States, Banco de Mexico and Bank Signatories, Aug. 29, 1985. The
August 1985 Agreement was one of a series of periodic restructuring agreements. See
supra notes 47-73 and accompanying text. In contrast to previous restructuring agree-
ments, the 1985 Agreement explicitly adopted an official debt-to-equity program. Its
operative provision is art. 5, cl. 5.11, reprinted in Operating Manual, supra note 158,
at V-22. See also Recent Development, supra note 160.
As noted in the Operating Manual:
Clause 5.11 of the Public Debt Restructuring Agreement of August 29,
1985 establishes the possibility of using the collecting rights of this debt to
convert them into equity of public or private companies. Such rights be-
long to the domestic and international banks that signed the restructuring
contracts with the entities and companies of the Mexican public
sector . . ..
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established a formal system of government supervision. The National
Commission on Foreign Investment (Commission)192 has been given the
responsibility for establishing the criteria upon which debt-for-equity
exchanges will be approved and for supervising the administration of
those exchanges.193
By adopting and adhering to explicit criteria for approving debt-
for-equity exchanges, Mexico has created a vital debt-for-equity pro-
gram.'94 Mexico has shown a willingness to tolerate a loss of domestic
control over Mexican business when foreign investment is expected to
provide the benefits of increased employment, investment and new tech-
nology. '5 To achieve these goals, the Commission has adopted a hier-
archical structure for determining which applications will be ap-
proved. 9 The Commission considers the export performance of
potential recipients of debt conversion capital and gives preference to
those companies showing a surplus in balance of payments.' 97 Priority
is also granted to projects which promote desirable technological devel-
opment.'98 In addition, the Commission prefers companies which al-
ready have majority foreign participation.'99 Above all, the Commission
Said Clause permits foreign investors to acquire those rights in the
markets and to exchange them for equity of public or private companies;
to complement the investment, to begin a company, or to pay their debt in
pesos.
Operating Manual, supra note 158, at V-7.
192 The Commission's establishment and its powers are described supra note 180.
193 The Commission established that "[ifn case the concerned acquisition is to be
carried out through debt capitalization or profit reinvestment, the previous authoriza-
tion of the National Commission on Foreign Investment is required." Foreign Invest-
ment Commission, General Resolution No. 5, reprinted in Operating Manual, supra
note 158, at V-4. For a complete description of the Commission's administrative proce-
dures, see Operating Manual, supra note 158, at V-9 to -12. For a discussion of the
criteria relied on in evaluating potential exchanges, see id. at V-4 to -7.
194 See Debt-Equity Swaps, supra note 31, at 1; Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 144-
45.
"' Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 155; see Operating Manual, supra note 158, at
V-4 to -7; Mexico Opens Key Sectors, supra note 171, at 667.
199 Operating Manual, supra note 158, at V-5. This heirarchy involves many of
the economic criteria that an investor would use in deciding what amount to pay for the
debt.
19,7 "The Commission considers in first place, those companies showing a surplus
in the balance of payments, in second place, those with an even balance, and in third
place those with a deficit." Id.
' "The Commission grants priority to projects with peak technology, second
place to those with median technology, and third place to those with old technology."
Id.
"I "The Commission grants preference for debt capitalization to those companies
that, at the moment of application, have 100% foreign capital; then to companies with a
majority of foreign capital, and last, to those that due to debt capitalization will pass
from a (foreign) minority or nil participation to majority or minority participation re-
spectively." Id.
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stresses expansion into new areas, economic development and the crea-
tion of jobs. 00
The current program, however, prudently limits exchanges to "ex-
clusively productive, not speculative, investments." ' Moreover, the
Commission thus far has restricted dividend remittances and capital re-
patriation during the first few years after investment.0 2 Both these pol-
icies demonstrate a judicious willingness to permit increased foreign in-
vestments where the risks of attendant abuses are reduced. Mexico, by
adhering to these sound principles of investment and by maintaining
careful supervision over its program has thus far been able to avoid the
risks of foreign20 3 and domestic204 financial domination. As a result,
Mexico has begun not only to retire some portion of its international
debt, but also to increase its inflows of foreign investment capital.20 5 In
the two-year period prior to September 11, 1986, Mexico engaged in
twenty-three exchanges and repaid over $300 million in debt.20 6 Addi-
tionally, an estimated $500 million in debt was exchanged for equity in
1986.07 Thus, Mexico presents an ideal model of a debtor nation's use
of debt-for-equity exchanges to alleviate its debt problems and to en-
'00 The Commission is guided by the principles set forth in the Mexican Invest-
ment Law and the 1984 Guidelines. Id. at V-3; see supra notes 178-93 and accompa-
nying text.
20- Operating Manual, supra note 158, at V-10.
202 Debt-Equity Swaps, supra note 31, at 3; see also Fiszman, supra note 177, at
158 (discussing incentives created by allowing control capital to be removed through
remittances and foreign repatriation); Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 144 (discussing need
for repatriation of capital within Mexico).
2' Debtor nations fear that allowing foreign capital unregulated access to their
economies will effectively deprive their people of control over their own economic
destiny. Foreigners may choose to invest only in the most lucrative areas of the economy
and transfer the resulting profits abroad. See Maviglia, supra note 18, at 283 & nn.13-
14, 286-87; see also L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 125-26; Clearing House Letter,
supra note 162, app. at 4-5.
204 The exercise of absolute national sovereignty over the legal rights of foreigners
diminishes the security of foreign investors. Where foreign investors lack control over
allocation of capital, repatriation of capital and maintenance of satisfactory returns,
they hesitate to participate in even the most attractive opportunities. See Fiszman,
supra note 177, at 157-58.
20 Debt-Equity Swaps, supra note 31, at 3.
206 Berg, supra note 155, at D1, col. 3. The Commission presents a higher esti-
mate, claiming that during 1983-1985 it achieved "favorable resolution for debt capital-
ization [of] 769.1 million dollars." Operating Manual, supra note 158, at V-3. It is
expected that Mexico will retire over $10 billion of its debt over the next decade. Chile
has also been extremely successful in its use of debt-for-equity swaps. In 26 deals over
a two-year period, Chile has retired $280 million in debt. Berg, supra note 155, at Dl,
col. 3.
20. Debt-Equity Swaps, supra note 31, at 1. As of August 1987, The New York
Clearing House estimates that Mexico has approved 178 debt-for-equity exchanges
with a total value of $1.5 billion since inaugurating its formal program in 1986. Clear-
ing House Letter, supra note 162, app. at 5.
19881
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
courage foreign investment.
3.2.4. Obstacles Arising from United States Accounting Practices
Despite the success of the Mexican program, debt-for-equity re-
mains a buyers' market at this time.2"8 From the standpoint of United
States creditors, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP),
which are promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) and define accepted accounting practices, make employment of
debt-for-equity exchanges a costly practice.2"9 The GAAP rules suggest
that loans must be marked to market whenever they are bought or
sold.21o
Regardless of the actual worth of an outstanding loan prior to its
sale or exchange, the loan is listed on the bank's books at the face value
of the original principal plus interest. However, once a market price
can be fixed by sale or exchange, accounting standards require that the
entire loan be adjusted to reflect the rate of that sale.211 Thus, if bank
208 Cf Fiszman, supra note 177, at 163 (commenting that Mexican foreign in-
vestment is "a buyer in buyer's markets").
209 See generally Debt-Equity Swaps, supra note 31, at 4-9 (discussing the uncer-
tain accounting and tax ramifications of debt-for-equity swaps). In addition, various
governmental restrictions prevent financial institutions from fully utilizing debt-for-eq-
uity swaps for their own benefit. See supra note 162 (discussing Regulation K of the
Federal Reserve Board). As a result most United States banks limit their participation
in debt-for-equity exchanges to brokering rather than exchanging their own debt. For
instance, although Citicorp is regarded as one of the leaders in the emerging debt-for-
equity market, Citicorp has actually exchanged little of its own debt. Current rules of
accounting also deter United States banks from exchanging their own debt. See Ollard,
supra note 163, at 74; Berg, supra note 155, at D5, col. 1.
210 ACCOUNTING BY DEBTORS AND CREDITORS FOR TROUBLED DEBT
RESTRUCTURINGS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 15, 11 27-39, 79-
82, 90-97 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1979); see M. MILLER, GAAP GUIDE: A
COMPREHENSIVE RESTATEMENT OF ALL CURRENTLY PROMULGATED GENERALLY
ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES § 40.01-.07 (1986) [hereinafter GAAP GUIDE]
(commenting on Standard No. 15). For additional discussion of the effects of the mark-
to-market rule, see Ollard, supra note 163, at 74; Berg, Banks Cool to Brazil Debt-for-
Bond Plan, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1987, at D4, col. 3 [hereinafter Berg, Banks Cool to
Brazil Debt-for-Bond Plan]; Lissakers, supra note 24, at A31, col. 1; Berg, supra note
155, at Dl, col. 1.
211 The GAAP GUIDE states:
Receipt of assets or equity: When the creditor receives either assets or
equity as full settlement of a receivable, he should account for these at
their fair value at the time of the restructuring. The fair value of the
receivable satisfied can be used if it is more clearly determinable than the
fair value of the asset or equity acquired. In partial debt payments the
creditor must use the fair value of the asset or equity received.
Combination of types: The creditor shall reduce his recorded investment
by the fair value of assets received.
GAAP GUIDE, supra note 210, § 40.06-.07 (emphasis added).
Brazil's proposal to exchange debt for bonds encountered this type of problem.
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A has a $10 million loan outstanding to country Y, the bank lists that
loan as a $10 million asset plus interest to be earned. In reality, the
loan may be worth substantially less, because the full $10 million will
never be recovered. 2 ' However, if the bank were to sell any portion of
that debt at a discounted rate (as would generally occur in a debt-for-
equity exchange),2 1 3 the portion of the loan exchanged, and perhaps the
entire loan,214. would have to be marked down to reflect GAAP's views
of market value. Under one of the most disadvantageous scenarios, if
bank A sold $2 million of the debt at a twenty percent discount rate,
i.e., the debt were purchased for $1.6 million, the entire remaining debt
would have to be discounted by twenty percent. The bank would value
its remaining asset at only $6.4 million. Although it could be argued
that the bank is merely being forced to recognize the real value of its
asset, there would be little incentive for a bank to engage in such a
costly recognition. 1 5 Perhaps most importantly, those banks which
have the largest loan problems, and which face the greatest financial
risk, would be unlikely to avail themselves of debt-for-equity relief be-
cause such relief would result in recognition of an across the board
loss.21 This type of problem could be remedied through a regulatory
adjustment or explicit ruling on the part of the FASB.217
The proposed scheme would have exchanged the debt for bonds, presumably with
lower interest rates, which the creditor banks would have been free to sell. Creditors
expressed concern about the actual value and practical effects of the bond scheme. The
partner in charge of technical accounting issues at the international accounting firm of
Ernst & Whinney stated that, if accountants concluded that an exchange had taken
place, "the new bonds would have to be valued at their fair market value, and the
banks would have to recognize a loss." Berg, Banks Cool to Brazil Debt-for-Bond
Plan, supra note 210, at D4, col. 4. Because the bonds were expected to have a value
of approximately 60% of the face amount of the debt exchanged, the banks would have
been forced to write-off 40% of the debt's value. Id.
The mark-to-market rule also arose as an obstacle to the Mexican debt-for-bond
scheme discussed supra note 105. The United States Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion [hereinafter SEC] announced that in its view any bank offering to exchange part of
its loan portfolio would have to mark the value of that part down to the price offered.
See Some Big Banks Plan to Shun Mexican Plan, supra note 72, at 2, col. 1; Ricks &
Truell, SEC Tells Banks How to Handle Mexico Debt Swap, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1988,
at 7, col. 2; Truell & Murray, supra note 5, at 4, col. 3. The SEC believed that the
mere act of bidding on the Mexican bonds would require a write-down whether or not
an actual exchange had occurred. See Some Big Banks Plan to Shun Mexican Plan,
supra note 72, at 2, col. 1.
212 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
213 See supra text accompanying notes 159, 164-67.
214 See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
215 See Ollard, supra note 163, at 74; Berg, supra note 155, at DS, col. 1.
216 Ollard, supra note 163, at 74; see also Some Big Banks Plan to Shun Mexican
Plan, supra note 72, at 2, col. 1; Berg, supra note 155, at D5, col. 1 (discussing fact
that most United States banks do not exchange their loans for equity).
2 1 Because the Financial Accounting Standards Board [hereinafter FASB] has not
yet formulated rules addressing these issues, accounting in this area is based on estima-
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Bankers Trust Company, one of the leading practitioners in the
debt-for-equity field, has devised an instructive way to avoid the di-
lemma. 18 This bank does not accept the market price as the true mar-
ket value of the paper it is exchanging.219 Bankers Trust regards the
fair value of the debt as the debtor's cost of raising new money, taking
into account factors such as rescheduling and trade finance. In calculat-
ing the value, Bankers Trust compares those figures with the current
loan yield, ultimately achieving what it deems to be the true market
value of the loan.2 '
Another possible valuation model would require the debt ex-
changed to be valued at the ultimate value of the equity purchased from
the debtor.221 In such situations, the real market value of the loan
would not be the price paid by the third party to the bank for purchase
of the loan, rather the market value would be recognized as the loan's
ultimate value in the debtor nation. For instance, when bank A sells $2
million of its interest in country Y's debt to a multinational corporation,
the market value of the debt should be based on what it would cost the
debtor to raise a similar amount of capital. Thus, if the corporation
exchanged the debt for $1.9 million in Mexican pesos, then bank A
would discount its remaining asset by only five percent.
Although these proposals tend to inflate the value of the exchanged
debt, the FASB should recognize that, where Third World debt is be-
ing accounted for, general standards do not apply.22 The FASB is pri-
marily concerned with ensuring that the bank's valuation of its assets
comports with what those assets are truly worth on the open market.
Yet, in the case of Third World debt, it is simply wrong to assume that
the presale or postsale value is an accurate reflection of the debt's true
worth.22 Although the debt is undoubtedly overvalued on its face, it
enjoys a certain degree of support by creditor governments and supra-
national finance organizations.224 Because that backing reflects a need
to balance the financial requirements of the debtor nations with the risk
of default faced by the creditors, it makes no sense for the FASB to
upset that balance, especially where to do so would obstruct the conver-
tion of the proper method. The problem of uncertain standards is currently being con-
sidered by the FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force. Debt-Equity Swaps, supra note
31, at 4.
218 See Ollard, supra note 163, at 74.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
223 See D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 1, at 233.
224 Id. at 226-27; see also L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 77; Bogdanowicz-Bindert,
supra note 16, at 263.
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sion of impaired debt into useful capital.225
3.2.5. Debt-for-Equity Caveats
Uncontrolled growth of the debt-for-equity market could lead to
certain inherent pitfalls. First, the very nature of a debt-for-equity ex-
change is inflationary; the mechanism requires the creation of new
money in a nation's economy. 2 6 However, proponents argue that the
threat is overstated and is no different from the effect of any new in-
flow of foreign exchange into a country. 2 7 Second, debt-for-equity ex-
changes create an incentive for debtor nations to auction off national
holdings. 2 Prevention of both these ills lies within the power of gov-
ernments in the debtor nations. Vigorous enforcement of well-drafted
regulatory guidelines would enable these nations to enjoy the benefits of
debt-for-equity exchanges without suffering their drawbacks. 229Finally,
by focusing too closely on their own pecuniary self-interest, financial
practitioners are allowing exchanges to develop as merely an expedient
trading mechanism.230 For instance, a recent article concentrated almost
exclusively on the profit potential for practitioners in this burgeoning
new market," 1 without fully exploring the overall effect of debt-for-
equity exchanges on creditors and debtors. Although the potential to
make a great deal of money through brokering debt does exist,232 the
value of exchanges as a tool for relieving the debt crisis will be lost if
125 The FASB could exempt certain Third World debt from the mark-to-market
standard based on frequency of rescheduling. For example, if a loan were subject to
annual or more frequent rescheduling, portions of it could be exchanged without mark-
ing the remaining debt to market. As one commentator has stated, "[a]ccounting rules
could be adjusted so that the banks could sell large chunks of troubled portfolios at
discounts without having to reflect these discounts in valuing similar loans they retain
." Lissakers, supra note 24, at A31, col. 3.
•2 See supra note 160; see also Clearing House Letter, supra note 162, app. at 4.
" Clearing House Letter, supra note 162, app. at 4.
21 See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (discussing privatization of
Latin American industry).
229 For a discussion of safeguards against the loss of national holdings provided by
Mexico's debt conversion program, see supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
With regard to the inflationary effects of debt-for-equity exchanges, one commentator
has noted that "[t]he central bank can in effect sterilize any money created through
debt-equity swaps by reducing its loans to domestic entities or reducing its purchases of
domestic assets, such as government securities." Clearing House Letter, supra note
162, app. at 4.
280 For example, Ollard presents debt-for-equity swaps as the latest "hot market"
and loses sight of the international implications of the debt crisis. Ollard, supra note
163; see also L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 62 (criticizing "the latest banking
fashions").
,3 Ollard, supra note 163.
2" It has been estimated that $1 million is made for every $100 million swapped.
See Berg, supra note 155, at D5, col. 1.
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debt exchanges come to be regarded solely as a new speculative market.
It would be tragic and economically devastating if thoughtless ex-
changes of, and speculation in, debt became so prevalent as to undo the
progress achieved in Latin America by past nationalization and
development.233
4. CONCLUSION
The Latin American debt crisis is not insuperable. Although wide-
spread rescheduling has created conflict between the objectives of devel-
opment and debt service, it has also staved off financial collapse.
23 4
Rescheduling, however, is not a permanent solution. The financial re-
strictions and trading disincentives that accompany rescheduling hinder
the recovery of Latin American economies. 33 In addition, the negative
economic effects of rescheduling quickly spread beyond debtor
nations.
2 36
Latin America can achieve economic health only if strategies are
devised that both alleviate the economic restrictions caused by the long-
term debt burden and, at the same time, create a favorable environment
for foreign investment and repatriation of flight capital. 37 Although
international countertrade arose out of necessity, it does offer a means
by which a debtor nation's immediate economic needs can be satisfied
without loss of vital foreign currency reserves.238 Countertrade, there-
fore, offers a limited means through which a favorable economic envi-
ronment can be fostered. Although United States policy makers may
have some ideological and practical objections to countertrade, 3 9 an ap-
propriate legislative response can minimize these reservations.
2 40
Debt-for-equity exchanges represent an additional means of en-
couraging foreign investment in debtor nations and offer the debtor a
means to counter financial restrictions. 4 Although debt-for-equity ex-
changes are not completely devoid of problems,242 Mexico has demon-
strated a willingness and ability to come to terms with these impedi-
ments. 43 Similarly, the obstacles on the creditors' side of the debt-
233 See Fiszman, supra note 177, at 150-53 (reviewing the history of Mexico's
foreign investment policy).
234 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
2319 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 151-76 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 177-82, 208-17 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 182-207 and accompanying text.
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equity equation, particularly in the United States, could be solved
through more responsive accounting practices.244
Solution of the world debt crisis will require a coordinated effort
to apply the various techniques for alleviating debt problems2 45 in an
orderly and effective manner.241 Currently, both debt-for-equity ex-
changes and countertrade remain unfocused and underutilized devices.
Regrettably, while rescheduling becomes fully accepted as an institu-
tionalized, supranational event,24 these newer mechanisms go largely
ignored.
244 See supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text. As one commentator has writ-
ten, "[slurely a marketplace that invents a new financial instrument every five seconds
can come up with a plan suitable to American banks. . . . [O]ur banking laws and
regulations are not written in stone. Neither banks nor regulators hesitate to challenge
or bend them when it suits their purposes." Lissakers, supra note 24, at A31, col. 2; see
also L. MALKIN, supra note 8, at 64.
245 See Alpern & Emerson, supra note 21, at A27, cols. 2-5 (listing various new
proposals to deal with the Latin American debt crisis).
z'4 See Kuczynski, supra note 1, at 148-49 (discussing precepts upon which inter-
national agreement is needed); Roett, supra note 3, at 716 (calling for a United States
initiative to devise an orderly rescheduling process).
247 See, e.g., Bolin & Del Canto, supra note 10, at 1100 (noting that one result of
the recent debt crisis has been to produce effective cooperation among banks, borrowing
countries and the IMF in rescheduling).
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